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INTRODUCTION
In 1979, a district court applied an affirmative defense to secondary
1
patent infringement in a copyright infringement case. The court did so
in order to protect a technology developer from copyright liability
caused by third parties using the developer’s product in an infringing
2
manner. The court’s intention was to avoid quashing a new technology
that was capable of many noninfringing uses and, thus, to prevent an
inequitable infringement judgment against an innovator solely because
individuals, outside the developer’s control, used the product
3
illegitimately. Over the next twenty-six years, district courts, courts of
appeal, and the U.S. Supreme Court have misinterpreted and disagreed
with each other’s decisions—and even at times with their own
decisions—over how to apply relevant principles of patent law in
copyright cases, that is, to strike the proper balance between protecting
4
copyright holders’ rights without restricting innovation. As the courts
have battled over this issue, billions of dollars of infringement have
occurred using new technology mediums, and once promising start-up
companies have gone bankrupt because of copyright infringement
5
judgments against them. As Justice Fortas so wisely said in addressing
the new technology of cable television:
[T]he fact that the Copyright Act was written in a different day,
for different factual situations, should lead [the judiciary] to
tread cautiously here. Our major object, I suggest, should be to
do as little damage as possible to traditional copyright principles
and to business relationships, until the Congress legislates and
relieves the embarrassment which we and the interested parties
6
face.
Unfortunately, the courts have not tread with caution and have done
much damage to the balance of copyright’s competing policies, which
has left both copyright owners and technology innovators facing great
uncertainty. Accordingly, Congress must step in and combat this
1. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 480 F. Supp. 429 (C.D. Cal.
1979), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 659 F.2d 963, (9th Cir. 1981), rev’d, 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
2. See id. at 460–61.
3. See id.
4. See, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005);
A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001); In re Aimster Copyright
Litig., 252 F. Supp. 2d 634 (N.D. Ill. 2002), aff’d, 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003).
5. See Jessica Litman, The Sony Paradox, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 917, 920–21, 941,
955–56 (2005).
6. Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 404 (1968) (Fortas,
J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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uncertainty by codifying a modern version of the Staple Article of
Commerce Doctrine’s affirmative defense (Staple Defense) into the
Copyright Act.
This Comment discusses the history and common law development
of the Staple Defense, this author’s legislative proposal, and why such a
proposal both clarifies the ambiguities caused by the current judicial
doctrine and strikes the proper balance of the competing policies that
underlie copyright.
I. THE HISTORY OF THE STAPLE DEFENSE

7

A. Early Copyright Cases Tackle Dual-Use Technologies
1. Sony: The Technology of Time-Shifting
a. The District Court’s Opinion: The Staple Defense Sneaks into
Copyright Law
In Universal Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America, the copyright
owners of publicly broadcast television shows sued the manufacturer
and distributor of a videotape recording device, the corporations that
sold and promoted the device, and a home user that operated the device
8
for violations under the Copyright Act.
First, the district court
determined that the copyright owners could not establish direct
infringement for home users recording publicly broadcast works
9
because the court found “time-shifting” to be a fair use. Although the
court’s finding ruled out holding the defendants liable for secondary
liability, the district court, in dicta, explored the possibility of secondary
10
liability if the home use was infringing use. In order to explore such
possibilities, the district court surveyed the then current state of
11
secondary liability. Because the Copyright Act was silent on secondary
liability, the district court noted two cases that addressed contributory
7. It is instructive to note that patent law’s development of the Staple Defense is
omitted from this Comment because it is irrelevant to implementing a practical application of
the Defense in copyright law. See, e.g., Brief of Professor Peter S. Menell et al. as Amici
Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 10–11, Grokster, 545 U.S. 913 (No. 04-480). In particular,
the patent law defense arose out of the patent misuse doctrine in order to balance
contributory liability and antitrust limitations on the patentee’s rights. See id. By enacting §
271(c) of the Patent Act, Congress “immuniz[ed] the sale of staple articles of commerce from
contributory liability” and, thus, “precluded patentees from leveraging their patents into the
sale of unprotected technologies.” See id. at 11.
8. See Sony, 480 F. Supp. at 432–33.
9. See id. at 456.
10. See id. at 457 (dicta).
11. See id. at 460.
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liability for copyright infringement and distinguished them from the
12
Specifically, the district court stated the
facts before the court.
following:
Plaintiffs’ claims are unprecedented. Unlike the defendant in
Gershwin, defendants here do not arrange for and direct the
programming for the infringing activity. Unlike the defendants
in Screen Gems I and II, defendants here do not sell or advertise
the infringing work. Plaintiffs sue defendants because they
manufacture, distribute, advertise and sell a product capable of a
variety of uses, some of them allegedly infringing.
....
Whether or not patent law has precedential value for
copyright law and the Betamax is capable of “substantial”
noninfringing use, the underlying rationale for the patent rule is
significant.
Commerce would indeed be hampered if
manufacturers of staple items were held liable as contributory
infringers whenever they “constructively” knew that some
purchasers on some occasions would use their product for a
purpose which a court later deemed, as a matter of first
13
impression, to be an infringement.
Finally, the court discussed the defendants’ hypothetical vicarious
14
liability by noting they did not sufficiently participate in and benefit
from home users recording publicly broadcast works to satisfy the
15
requirements to be held liable under such claims.
b. The Ninth Circuit’s Opinion
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit took a different stance than the district
court by holding that the act of home recording does not qualify as a fair
16
use and thus is a direct infringement. The court found the defendantsappellees to be contributorily liable for the direct infringement carried
out by the home recording because they knew their device would be
used to reproduce copyrighted works and “there [was] no doubt” they
“induc[ed], caus[ed], or materially contribut[ed] to the infringing
17
conduct.”
12. See id.
13. See id. at 460–61.
14. It appears as though the district court was not referring to vicarious liability as it is
referred to today, but rather contributory infringement. See id. at 462.
15. See id.
16. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 659 F.2d 963, 971–72 (9th Cir.
1981), rev’d, 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
17. Id. at 975–76.
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The Ninth Circuit addressed the district court’s dicta application of
the Staple Defense by stating that “[v]ideotape recorders are
manufactured, advertised, and sold for the primary purpose of
reproducing television programming.
Virtually all television
programming is copyrighted material. Therefore, videotape recorders
18
are not ‘suitable for substantial noninfringing use.’”
c. The Supreme Court’s Opinion: Mr. Rogers Sides with Technology
and Five Justices Side with Mr. Rogers
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and after a tutorial on
copyright policy, the Court embraced secondary liability as implied by
19
the Copyright Act.
The Supreme Court carefully presented the
principle that finding secondary liability for copyright infringement
increases the scope of the copyright holder’s monopoly and recognized
the need to balance this augmentation so as not to “extend [the
copyright holder’s] monopoly beyond the limits of [his or her] specific
20
grant.” Accordingly, the Court cited patent law for the principle to
combat this increase by “expressly provid[ing] that the sale of a ‘staple
article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing
21
use’ is not contributory [copyright] infringement.” As the stage was
set, the Supreme Court stated that “the sale of copying equipment, like
the sale of other articles of commerce, does not constitute contributory
infringement if the product is widely used for legitimate,
unobjectionable purposes. Indeed, it need merely be capable of
22
substantial noninfringing uses.”
Next, the Court jumped right into the deep end and asked whether
the device at hand was “capable of commercially significant
23
noninfringing uses.”
However, in the same paragraph in which it
posed that question, it refused to decide “how much use [would be]
commercially significant”; instead, the Court found that the “potential
use” of home users operating the device for time-shifting purposes met

18. Id. at 975 (citation omitted).
19. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 435 (1984) (5-4
decision) (“The absence of such express language in the copyright statute does not preclude
the imposition of liability for copyright infringements on certain parties who have not
themselves engaged in the infringing activity.”).
20. Id. at 441.
21. Id. at 440 (discussing 35 U.S.C. § 271(c)).
22. Id. at 442 (emphasis added).
23. Id.
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24

the requisite threshold. In answering the aforementioned question, the
Court found the use to be substantially noninfringing because plaintiffsrespondents had a combined relevant market share of less than ten
25
percent. With respect to the other ninety percent of the market share,
the Supreme Court cited the district court’s injunctive relief findings to
establish that “a significant quantity of broadcasting” had authorized
time-shifting and “a significant potential for future authorized copying”
26
existed.
To further support this proposition, the Court cited the
27
testimony of Mr. Rogers —the defendants-petitioners’ star witness—
28
that he encouraged time-shifting by his viewers. Consequently, the
Court held that copyright owners may not prevail in contributory
liability claims unless the relief they request affects solely their
copyrights or the copyright owner “speaks for virtually all copyright
29
holders with an interest in the outcome.”
Finally, the Court found that “unauthorized home time-shifting” of
30
publicly broadcast television shows was fair use and thus noninfringing.
Accordingly, because secondary liability requires a finding of the direct
infringement, the Court held defendant-petitioners not liable for
31
contributorily infringing plaintiffs-respondents’ copyrights.
i. Justice Stevens’s Dicta
Although the Court saw time-shifting for home users as a fair use
and thus, technically, the opinion designated almost all use of the device
as noninfringing, the Court’s alternative reasoning for protecting the
defendant-petitioners vis-à-vis the Staple Defense lead to some
32
quantitative reasoning by the Court. Specifically, the Court explained
that the Betamax was capable of substantial noninfringing uses “both
because [plaintiff-]respondents have no right to prevent other copyright
holders from authorizing it for their programs, and . . .
because . . . unauthorized home time-shifting . . . [was] legitimate fair

24. Id.
25. See id. at 443.
26. Id. at 444.
27. Fred Rogers was president of the corporation that produced and owned the
copyright to Mister Rogers’ Neighborhood, the popular children’s program in which he
starred on the Public Broadcasting Service.
28. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 445–46 & n.27.
29. Id. at 446.
30. Id. at 442.
31. Id. at 456.
32. Id. at 445.
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use.”
Moreover, the Court stated that the defendant-petitioners
“demonstrated a significant likelihood that substantial numbers of
copyright holders who license[d] their works for broadcast on free
television would not [have] object[ed] to having their broadcasts time34
shifted by private viewers.”
Consequently, this author makes the
assumption that even if unauthorized time-shifting were not a fair use,
authorized time-shifting was, individually, a substantial enough use of
the Betamax to justify applying the Staple Defense. Such reasoning
requires some creative accounting on the part of this author to get to a
range that approximates the Court’s interpretation of “substantial.”
First, the plaintiffs-respondents had a market share “well below
35
10%.” Disney had “one hour a week of network television and one
syndicated series,” whereas Universal had “under 5%” in a major U.S.
36
market. That leaves the range of approximately five to ten percent
infringing use. Accordingly, analysis continues to determine how much
of the ninety to ninety-five percent figure one could categorize as
noninfringing use.
John Kenaston, Channel 58’s station manager, testified that out of
the 107 programs on his station, “58% authorize[d] some home taping”
37
and “almost 20% authorize[d] unrestricted home taping.” Assuming
this sample was consistent with the other stations not party to this suit,
then such a proposition adds twenty-two percent infringing use to the
running total. Moreover, the district court found that the “[d]efendants’
survey showed that 96% of the Betamax owners had used the machine
38
to record programs they otherwise would have missed.” Thus, four
percent used the Betamax for purposes other than time-shifting, which
may have violated the restrictions of fifty-eight percent of the programs
39
on Kenaston’s channel that “authorize some home taping.”
As a
result, this author adds another two percent to the running total of
infringing uses. In sum, this author calculates a total of approximately
twenty-nine to thirty-four percent infringing uses and sixty-six to
seventy-one percent noninfringing uses, thus defining a range for the
Staple Defense.

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id. at 442 (emphasis added).
Id. at 456 (emphasis added).
Id. at 443.
Id. at 443 n.22.
Id. at 445.
Id. at 424 n.4.
Id. at 445 (emphasis added).
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ii. Justice Blackmun’s Dissenting Opinion
Justice Blackmun—joined by three other justices—outlined the
notion that “[w]hen the use is one that creates no benefit to the public at
large, copyright protection should not be denied on the basis that a new
40
technology that may result in harm has not yet done so.” Following
this proposition, the dissenting justices disagreed with the majority that
41
the patent law test “should be imported wholesale into copyright law.”
Instead, the dissenting justices proposed a modified test to remove
uncertainty in its application. Specifically, “if a significant portion of the
product’s use is noninfringing, the manufacturers and sellers cannot be
42
held contributorily liable for the product’s infringing uses.” However,
“[i]f virtually all of the product’s use . . . is to infringe, contributory
liability may be imposed; if no one would buy the product for
noninfringing purposes alone, it is clear that the manufacturer is
purposely profiting from the infringement, and that liability is
43
appropriately imposed.”
In critiquing the majority’s “capable of substantial noninfringing
uses” standard, the dissenting justices suggested that “[o]nly the most
unimaginative manufacturer would be unable to demonstrate that a . . .
44
product is ‘capable’ of substantial noninfringing uses.”
Moreover,
“[b]ecause of the Court’s conclusion concerning the legality of timeshifting, it never addresse[d] the amount of noninfringing use that a
manufacturer must show to absolve itself from liability as a contributory
45
infringer.”
2. RCA Records: Controlling the Use of Copyrighted Works
In the same year the Supreme Court decided Sony, the Southern
District of New York applied the principles from Sony in a preliminary
46
injunction hearing.
In RCA Records v. All-Fast Systems, Inc., the
plaintiffs owned copyrighted sound recordings, which they sold to the
47
public on audiocassette tapes that the plaintiffs manufactured. The

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id. at 482 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Id. at 491.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 498.
Id.
See RCA Records v. All-Fast Sys., Inc., 594 F. Supp. 335 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
See id. at 336–37.
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defendant ran a neighborhood copy center that operated “a ‘Rezound’
48
cassette-copying machine.”
The plantiffs established that the defendant’s sales personnel sold
blank Rezound-compatible tapes to its customers and then used the
Rezound to copy the protected material from the plaintiffs’ cassette
tapes to the Rezound tapes for a lesser cost to the customer than the
49
retail purchase price of plaintiffs’ cassette tapes. Moreover, the district
court had no doubt that the sales personnel “were well aware of both
the copyrighted nature of the taped copies and the wrongfulness of the
copying” because “a decal warning against such copyright was plastered
50
on the machine.” Accordingly, the district court held that plaintiffs
established a “likelihood of success on the merits” for a finding that the
51
defendant directly infringed plaintiffs’ copyrights.
In determining the scope and terms of the injunction, the district
court noted that the plaintiffs were “entitled” to a preliminary
injunction, which prevented any direct infringement of plaintiffs’
copyrighted works and also any contributory infringement involving the
defendant’s customers using the Rezound to make copies on their own
52
accord.
Such prevention of contributory infringement would have
required the defendant to cease “selling Rezound cassettes—the only
type of cassette which [could] be successfully used in [the] Rezound—to
customers who the defendants” knew or had a reasonable belief would
53
use the Rezound to copy the plaintiffs’ copyrighted materials.
In
response, the defendants claimed that the Rezound was “capable of
substantial noninfringing uses” and, therefore, the injunction could not
extend to prevent contributory infringement because it would prevent
54
their legal use of the Rezound.
In its interpretation of Sony, the district court held that the Staple
Defense “extends protection only to the manufacturer of the infringing
55
The district court reasoned that
machine, not to its operator.”
contributory liability had been “traditionally” imposed on “those who
were ‘in a position to control the use of copyrighted works by others and
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
(1984)).
55.

Id. at 337.
See id.
Id.
Id. at 338.
See id. at 338–39.
Id.
Id. (quoting Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 440
Id.
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had authorized the use without permission from the copyright owner.’”
Accordingly, the manufacturer of the Rezound lacked “such control
once the machine [was] sold”; however, the defendant was “aware of
each use of the machine” and could have “control[led] its customers’
57
infringing activities.”
The court found—for purposes of the preliminary injunction—that
the Rezound was capable of substantial noninfringing uses and
“requiring [the] defendant to avoid contributory infringement” would
not be “an undue burden on its right to pursue those” noninfringing
58
uses. In contrast, “[t]he manufacturer of the machine ma[de] but one
59
commercial choice: to sell or not to sell its machine.” Therefore, the
court held that if it found the manufacturer liable for contributory
infringement, then it would impose a “substantial burden” because the
only way the manufacturer could cease the infringing use would be to
60
halt selling the Rezound. As a result, although the court enjoined the
defendant from directly or contributorily infringing plaintiffs’
copyrighted works, the court refused to seize the machine because such
an order would “prevent the legitimate and socially beneficent uses of
61
the Rezound.”
The district court later awarded a permanent injunction and
62
statutory damages to the plaintiffs.
The defendant did not file an
appeal.
3. Vault Corp.: The Defendant Wins One
a. The District Court’s Decision
In Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., the plaintiff owned the
copyright in a software program called “PROLOK,” which had a
security measure that prevented users from making working copies of
63
PROLOK.
The defendant developed a software program called
“CopyWrite,” which allowed users to make working copies of

56. Id. (quoting Sony, 464 U.S. at 440).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 340.
62. See RCA Records v. All-Fast Sys., Inc., No. 84 Civ. 631-CSH, 1985 WL 3059, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 9, 1985).
63. See Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 655 F. Supp. 750, 752 (E.D. La. 1987), aff’d,
847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988).
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PROLOK. The plaintiff moved to preliminarily enjoin the defendant
from, inter alia, marketing or selling the portion of CopyWrite, which
unlocked the security feature of PROLOK and “infring[ed ] or
65
contributorily infring[ed ]” the plaintiff’s copyright in PROLOK. The
owner of the defendant corporation testified at trial that the only
function of RAMKEY—that is, the feature in CopyWrite, which
actually unlocked PROLOK’s security—was to create copies of material
66
on copy-protected disks.
With respect to direct infringement, the plaintiff claimed (1) that the
defendant’s employees made an unauthorized copy of plaintiff’s work in
temporary memory every time those employees booted PROLOK in
their computers and (2) that RAMKEY was an unauthorized derivative
67
work of PROLOK. Furthermore, the plaintiff argued the defendant
was contributorily liable for CopyWrite users making unauthorized
68
copies of PROLOK.
The district court held that the defendant did not make such
unauthorized copies of PROLOK as the plaintiff claimed because § 117
of the Copyright Act exempted such use as an “essential step in the
69
utilization” of PROLOK.
Moreover, the district court held that
although the defendant copied thirty characters of code from PROLOK
to develop RAMKEY, such use did not substantially incorporate
70
enough of PROLOK to constitute preparing a derivative work.
71
The district court erroneously held that the plaintiff lacked standing
to bring suit for contributory infringement against the defendant, but
alternatively found that the defendant would not have been liable for
contributory infringement if standing existed because CopyWrite was
“cable of ‘commercially significant noninfringing uses,’ such as [(1)]
making archival copies of software programs as allowed by Section
117(2) of the Copyright Act,” (2) “mak[ing] copies of unprotected
72
software,” and (3) diagnosing “the quality” of software. Accordingly,

64. See id.
65. Id. at 757.
66. See Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 258 (5th Cir. 1988).
67. Vault Corp., 655 F. Supp. at 758.
68. Id.
69. Id. (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 117).
70. See id. at 759.
71. See Vault Corp., 847 F.2d at 262–63.
72. Vault Corp., 655 F. Supp. at 759 (quoting Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 440 (1984)).
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the district court did not grant the plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary
73
injunction against the defendant.
b. The Fifth Circuit’s Decision
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s opinion that the
defendant-appellee did not directly infringe the plaintiff-appellant’s
copyright in PROLOK by making unauthorized copies or preparing
74
unauthorized derivative works of PROLOK. In addition, the Fifth
Circuit agreed with the district court’s reasoning regarding such alleged
75
direct infringement. Although the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district
court’s finding that the defendant-appellee did not contributorily
infringe the plaintiff-appellant’s copyright in PROLOK, the Fifth
76
Circuit’s reasoning differed from that of the district court.
Contrary to the district court, the Fifth Circuit held that the plaintiffappellant had standing for contributory infringement claims against the
77
defendant-appellee.
Moreover, because the plaintiff-appellant was
only seeking to enjoin the defendant-appellee from advertising the
RAMKEY portions of CopyWrite and because RAMKEY was
separable from CopyWrite, the issue of whether the defendant-appellee
contributorily infringed plaintiff-appellant’s copyright hinged on
78
“whether the RAMKEY feature ha[d] substantial noninfringing uses.”
The Fifth Circuit found that copies of PROLOK made with a nonRAMKEY version of CopyWrite did not allow users to create archives
of PROLOK, which were “fully functional” replacements of the original
79
disks. Specifically, the copies of PROLOK, which a non-RAMKEY
version of CopyWrite would create, could not be used without the
original PROLOK disks and, thus, could not be used if the originals
80
became corrupt or lost. However, archival copies of PROLOK that
were made with versions of CopyWrite, which had RAMKEY, could be
81
used without the original disks. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit held
that “[b]ecause § 117(2) [of the Copyright Act] permit[ted] the making
of fully functional archival copies,” RAMKEY was “capable of
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

See id. at 764.
See Vault Corp., 847 F.2d at 261, 268.
See id.
See id. at 261–67.
Id. at 262–63.
Id. at 263–64 (emphasis added).
See id. at 264.
See id.
See id.
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substantial noninfringing uses”; thus, the defendant-appellee did not
82
contributorily infringe the plaintiff-appellant’s copyright.
B. The Next Generation of Infringement: The Peer-to-Peer Network
Cases
1. Napster: Sampling and Space-Shifting
a. The District Court’s Decision

83

In A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., the defendant distributed a
free software program, which allowed Internet users to freely upload
and download, inter alia, Moving Pictures Expert Group Layer 3 files,
84
more commonly known by its file extension as MP3 files.
The
defendant’s software program uploaded a list of the names of the MP3
files, which were shared on a user’s hard drive, to the defendant’s main
85
server. Next, this information was shared with the other users on the
defendant’s network and those users could then “locate music by their
86
favorite artists in MP3 format.” Once located, the main server would
point the individual user’s software client to the “host” user’s
computer—via its Internet Protocol (IP) address—which housed the
MP3 file that the individual user requested, so the user could download
87
the file. In addition, users had the option of “hotlisting” each other so
they could browse and download MP3 files directly from each others’
88
libraries. In sum, the defendant’s servers only stored a list of names of
89
the songs that each user shared along with each user’s IP address. The
content—that is, the copyright protected work—was transferred over
the Internet directly between the users and was not stored on
90
defendant’s servers. Most impressively, this service had approximately
91
seventy-five million users.

82. Id. at 267.
83. The district court made other rulings before ruling on the preliminary injunction;
however, Judge Patel’s opinion regarding the preliminary injunction is the only such ruling
that is within the scope of this Comment.
84. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 900 (N.D. Cal. 2000), aff’d
in part, rev’d in part, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
85. Id. at 901.
86. Id. (citation omitted).
87. Id. at 905.
88. Id.
89. See id.
90. See id. at 907.
91. See id. at 902.
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The plaintiffs, made up of eighteen record companies, moved for a
preliminary injunction against the defendant’s peer-to-peer software
service to enjoin it “from engaging in or assisting others in copying,
downloading, uploading, transmitting, or distributing copyrighted music
92
without the express permission of the rights owner.” To support their
motion, the plaintiffs’ expert witness calculated that eighty-seven
percent of the files transferred using the defendant’s software were
copyrighted, and counsel for the Recording Industry Association of
America (RIAA) determined that the plaintiffs collectively owned the
93
copyrights of approximately seventy percent of the files transferred.
In the district court’s vicarious and contributory liability analysis, it
found that users of the defendant’s service directly infringed the
plaintiffs’ copyrights by partaking in unauthorized distribution and
94
reproduction of plaintiffs’ works. Next, the district court addressed the
95
defendant’s Staple Defense. The district court stated that “Sony stands
for the rule that a manufacturer is not liable for selling a ‘staple article
of commerce’ that is ‘capable of commercially significant noninfringing
96
uses.’” The defendant argued what it felt were three noninfringing
uses that its peer-to-peer software network was capable of achieving:
“sampling, space-shifting, and the authorized distribution of new artists’
97
work.”
98
The district court found that sampling and space-shifting were
clearly infringement under the Copyright Act unless such activities were
99
found to be fair uses. The court then held both types of activities not
100
to be fair uses. Specifically, the court found sampling not to be a fair
use because, inter alia, a “user who downloads a copy of a song to her

92. Id. at 900.
93. Id. at 903. Counsel for the RIAA used the data sample from the plaintiffs’ expert
witness to make that determination. See id.
94. See id. at 911.
95. See id. at 912.
96. Id. (quoting Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442
(1984)).
97. Id. at 913. This same language is included in the “New Artists Program,” which the
defendant launched after the plaintiffs filed suit in this case. Although the injunction did not
seek to enjoin this feature of the program, the court dismissed it as “not a major aspect of the
Napster business plan[;] . . . bona fide new artists constituted a very small percentage of music
available on Napster.” Id. at 917.
98. Space-shifting consisted of the act of a user accessing a sound recording through the
defendant’s service, which the user legitimately owned in another format.
99. Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 913.
100. See id.
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hard drive may make that song available to millions of other individuals,
even if she eventually chooses to purchase the CD”; that is, the court
feared that “[s]o-called sampling on Napster may quickly facilitate
101
unauthorized distribution at an exponential rate.”
With respect to
space-shifting, the court further entertained the idea that even if it was a
fair use, as time-shifting was found to be in Sony, space-shifting did not
represent enough of a use; in particular, such use was the “occasional
102
use” of the defendants’ software program. The court further declined
to extend the Staple Defense because the defendant “maintain[ed] and
supervise[d]” the “system that users must access to upload or download
103
files.”
In other words, the court refused to extend the doctrine in a
situation where “the defendant continue[d] to exercise control over the
104
device’s use.”
As a result, the district court held that the plaintiffs showed a
“reasonable likelihood of success” on their contributory and vicarious
liability claims and granted their preliminary injunction motion against
105
the defendant.
b. Chief Judge Patel’s Dicta
Confident with its decision, the district court dovetailed its reasoning
with both the plaintiffs’ and defendant’s expert data by stating, in dicta,
that “even if space-shifting [was] a fair-use it [was] not substantial
106
enough to preclude liability under the” Staple Defense. In particular,
the court noted that the defendant’s expert testified that seventy percent
107
of its users “at least sometimes engage in space-shifting.”
However,
the defendant’s expert’s report stated that “more than a third of Napster
users (36.3%) always or frequently use[d] Napster to download digital
music files of songs that they had previously purchased in another
format” and “[a]nother 34.6% sometimes engage[d] in this practice of
108
Although “sometimes” is a vague quantity, the
space[-]shifting.”
survey shows that space-shifting comprises between 36.3% and 70.9% of

101. Id.
102. Id. at 916.
103. Id. at 917.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 920, 922, 927.
106. Id. at 916 (dicta) (emphasis added).
107. Id. (dicta).
108. Expert Report of Peter S. Fader, Ph.D. ¶ 77, Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d 896 (Nos. C
99-5183 MHP, C 00-0074 MHP), available at http://fl1.findlaw.com/news.findlaw.com/
hdocs/docs/napster/napster/fader_070300.pdf.
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109

the use. It is instructive to note, of course, that the word “sometimes”
would greatly decrease the 34.6% value and, thus, the space-shifting use
110
In contrast, the
was likely much closer to 36.3% than 70.9%.
plaintiffs’ expert report allowed this author to extract a range of
approximately 17.8% to 32.9% of college students surveyed who space111
shifted.
Because the court was confident that it was correct under
both experts’ analyses, the court, by inference, stated that even if a
112
device has 36.3% noninfringing uses, that was not enough to be
113
“substantial” under the Staple Defense.
c. The Ninth Circuit’s Opinion
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court on all issues but one: its
114
interpretation of the Staple Defense. Like the court in Sony and this
district court, the Ninth Circuit refused to attach a quantitative value to
115
the Staple Defense.
However, the Ninth Circuit disagreed with the
district court that the defendant-appellant “failed to demonstrate that
its system [was] capable of commercially significant uses” because “[t]he

109. See id.
110. See id.
111. Report of E. Deborah Jay, Ph.D. at 10, 21, Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d 896 (Nos. C 995183 MHP, C 00-0074 MHP), 2000 WL 34744110. The total number of students surveyed was
500. See id. According to Table 7, 48.3% already owned less than 10% of the songs they
downloaded; 17.2% already owned between 10 and 25% of the songs they downloaded;
15.6% already owned between 26 and 50% of the songs they downloaded; 10.6% already
owned between 51 and 75% of the songs they downloaded; 3.4% already owned between 76
and 99% of the songs they downloaded; 2.4% already owned 100% of the songs they
downloaded; and 2.2% were unsure how many of the songs they downloaded were songs they
already owned. See id. at 21.
This author then converted these figures into raw numbers—that is, multiplying each
percent by 500 (the sample size). See id. Next, this author multiplied each raw number by the
floor and ceiling of its respective range. See id. For example, of the 48.3% that already
owned less than 10% of the songs they downloaded, this author converted 48.3% into the raw
number 243 and multiplied 243 by the floor of the range, which is 0%, and the ceiling of the
range, which is 10%. See id. This author gave the unsure subjects a floor of 0% and a ceiling
of 100%. See id. Next, this author added up the floor values and divided the aggregate floor
value by the sample size. See id. The resulting value is the floor of the range referenced in
the text of this Comment. Last, this author added up the ceiling values and divided the
aggregate ceiling value by the sample size. See id. The resulting value is the ceiling of the
range referenced in the text of this Comment. See id.
112. This is the floor value and, thus, does not take into account the additional 34.6% of
users who “sometimes” space-shift because of the arbitrary decision that this author would
have to make to include said additional value.
113. See Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 916 (by implication).
114. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1021 (9th Cir. 2001).
115. See id.
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district court improperly confined the use analysis to current uses,
116
Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit
ignoring the system’s capabilities.”
criticized the district court for failing to give weight “to current and
117
future noninfringing use.”
Notwithstanding the district court’s erroneous interpretation of the
Staple Defense, the Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court’s
decision that “plaintiffs[-appellees] would likely prevail in establishing
that” the defendant-appellant “knew or had reason to know of its users’
118
infringement of plaintiffs’ copyrights.” Analogizing to the pre-Digital
Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) case Religious Technology Center
v. Netcom On-line Communication Services, Inc., the Ninth Circuit held
that “if a computer system operator learns of specific infringing material
available on his system and fails to purge such material from the system,
119
the operator knows of and contributes to direct infringing.”
Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit noted that “absent any specific
information which identifies infringing activity, a computer system
operator cannot be liable for contributory infringement merely because
the structure of the system allows for the exchange of copyrighted
120
material.”
Finally, the court went on to conclude that the defendant-appellant
had “actual knowledge that specific infringing material [was] available
using its system” and had the ability to deny access to infringers but
121
decided not to take such action. Therefore, the Ninth Circuit affirmed
122
the district court’s finding regarding contributory infringement. In its
affirmation of the district court’s vicarious liability ruling, the Ninth
Circuit explained that a proper interpretation of Sony led the court to
the conclusion that the Staple Defense was only for contributory
123
infringement and not for vicarious liability.

116. Id. (citing Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 433
(1984)) (emphasis added).
117. Id. (citing Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 258 (5th Cir. 1988)).
118. Id.
119. Id. (citing Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-line Commc’n Servs., Inc., 907 F.
Supp. 1361, 1374 (N.D. Cal. 1995)).
120. Id. (citing Sony, 464 U.S. at 436, 442–43).
121. Id. at 1022 (citing A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 920–21
(N.D. Cal. 2000)).
122. Id. at 1021–22.
123. Id. at 1022 (citing Sony, 464 U.S. at 434–35; 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID
NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 12.04[A][2], [2][b] (2000)).
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As a result, the defendant-appellant settled the suit for thirty-six
million dollars, and with a fifty million dollar loan, it restructured to
implement a new business model of distributing authorized music on its
124
system.
The defendant-appellant received access to over 700,000
songs from various major recording labels to legitimately distribute
125
through a modified electronic system.
2. In re Aimster: The Mere Potential for Noninfringing Use
a. The District Court’s Opinion
In the case of In re Aimster Copyright Litigation, the plaintiffs
owned the copyrights in the sound recordings and underlying
126
compositions of almost all of the popular music in America.
The
defendants developed, operated, and maintained a peer-to-peer filesharing service called “Aimster,” which allowed users with an Internet
connection to share any file they had access to on their personal
127
computers.
Accordingly, the plaintiffs sought to preliminarily enjoin
the defendants from contributorily and vicariously infringing the
128
plaintiffs’ copyrighted works.
129
The district court described the defendants’ system in detail. First,
Internet users went to Aimster’s Web site and downloaded the Aimster
software for free or “Club Aimster” software for a membership charge
130
of $4.95 each month. After downloading the software, the users were
131
then able to install the Aimster software on their personal computers.
When the user ran Aimster, the software would “piggyback” on
America Online’s instant messaging network, using the network as the
132
server, which connected all Aimster users to each other. The user had
to enter a login and password, which he or she had to register with the
133
Aimster service before being able to browse other users’ files.

124. Brad King, Napster Settles, Eyes Relaunch, WIRED NEWS, Sept. 24, 2001, available
at http://www.wired.com/news/mp3/1,47075-0.html.
125. See id.
126. See In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 252 F. Supp. 2d 634, 639 (N.D. Ill. 2002), aff’d,
334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003).
127. See id. at 638.
128. See id. at 646.
129. See id. at 634–46.
130. Id. at 642, 645. At the time of the litigation, the defendants required users to join
“Club Aimster” in order to use the software. Id. at 645.
131. See id. at 642.
132. See id.
133. See id.
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Aimster acted like anabolic steroids for the file transfer functions of
134
First, the user would
America Online’s instant messenger services.
designate the files to which he or she had access and that he or she
135
wanted to share with other Aimster users. Next, the Aimster software
would communicate this information to a database index on Aimster’s
136
Finally, the Aimster software gave each of its users, without
server.
137
any restrictions, the ability to, inter alia, search for any file that any
specific Aimster user or all Aimster users had available for sharing at
that point in time and the ability to directly download the files that were
138
available.
The Aimster server was in constant communication with the Aimster
software to facilitate the searches; however, each user stored his or her
own files on his or her own personal computer and the actual transfer of
139
the files occurred directly between the computers of Aimster users.
The Aimster software encrypted the files for such direct transfers and
140
then decrypted the files once the transferee completed the download.
Moreover, although any person with the Aimster software could view
the files each Aimster user designated as available for distribution, the
encryption scheme prevented any individuals from conclusively
determining that any specific material had actually transferred between
141
two Aimster users.
Nonetheless, the plaintiffs’ agents were able to
download “every single recording on the November 3, 2001 Billboard
Hot 100,” and “every single Top 10 recording from the period between
142
November 5, 2000 and November 3, 2001.” Moreover, the defendants’
Aimster Web site linked to a tutorial called “Guardian” (Guardian
Tutorial) that detailed how one would go about downloading
143
copyrighted works using the Aimster software; users posted messages
on Aimster message boards, inter alia, requesting or offering
copyrighted works and bad mouthing the recording industry; and the
Aimster software presented Club Aimster users with links to download

134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

See id.
See id. at 641.
See id.
In addition, Aimster users could instant message each other. Id.
See id. at 642.
See id. at 643.
See id.
See id.
Id. at 646.
Id. at 643.
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the forty “most frequently downloaded” songs, the copyrights of which
144
happened to be owned by the plaintiffs.
The court commenced its liability analysis by exploring the direct
infringement of the Aimster users as a necessary first ingredient for any
145
secondary liability. The defendants did not dispute “the existence of
direct infringement by Aimster’s users,” but instead argued that the
Audio Home Recording Act of 1992 shielded the Aimster users from
146
liability. The court rejected the defendants’ argument and continued
to analyze the defendants’ secondary liability for the Aimster users’
147
direct infringement.
The district court found that the plaintiffs “demonstrated a
likelihood of success on the merits for” defendants to be contributory
148
infringers. With respect to the requisite knowledge, the district court
found that the (1) letters from the RIAA to the defendants
demonstrating the availability of copyrighted works on Aimster, (2)
Guardian Tutorial, (3) message boards discussing the availability of—
and requests for—copyrighted materials and anti-copyright messages,
and (4) defendants’ “operation of Club Aimster all demonstrate . . .
149
[their] actual knowledge of the infringing activity.” Furthermore, the
court conceded that although “the actual transfers between users are
unknown to [d]efendants due to Aimster’s encryption scheme,” the
encryption did “not prevent [d]efendants from having constructive
150
knowledge.”
With respect to the requisite contribution, the district
court held that the defendants provided “the support services necessary
for individual Aimster users to connect with each other,” thus providing
151
the services necessary for the users to distribute copyrighted materials.
Moreover, Club Aimster provided an interface for users to point-andclick their way to downloading the plaintiffs’ most popular copyrighted
152
works.
The court noted that the “[d]efendants manage[d] to do
everything but actually steal the music off the store shelf and hand it to
153
Aimster’s users.”
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

Id.
See id. at 648.
Id.
See id. at 649.
Id. at 654.
Id. at 650.
Id. at 651.
Id. at 652.
See id.
Id.
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The defendants claimed, inter alia, that they could not be held liable
for contributory infringement because Aimster was “capable of
154
substantial non-infringing uses.”
The defendants argued such uses
included the following: (1) “the ability of Aimster users to transfer . . .
non-copyrighted files and messages to other users”; (2) “the ability of
users to identify other users with similar interests, share information,
and develop clubs”; and (3) the ability of “businesses without a network
administrator . . . to exchange business records securely and
155
efficiently.”
First, the district court rejected this defense because of its very
narrow interpretation of Sony to mean that in order for the defendants
to take safe harbor under the Staple Defense, the defendants had to
show that the noninfringing use of their device was the “primary use”
156
because in Sony, time-shifting was the “principal use” of the Betamax.
The district court noted that even if the defendants presented evidence
that the Aimster users used the service for legitimate and noninfringing
purposes, “the mere inclusion of such evidence would not suffice unless
[the evidence] tended to show that such use constituted Aimster’s
157
primary use.” Second, the district court noted that “Sony only applied
to a ‘staple article of commerce,’” that is, an item distributed to
158
“customers who thereafter use the machine as they see fit.”
Accordingly, the district court described Aimster as a “service” that
“involve[d] an ongoing relationship between the direct infringers (the
users) and the contributory infringers (the [d]efendants),” and,
therefore, the district court held that Aimster was not a staple article of
159
Third, the district court found “that Aimster [was] a
commerce.
service specifically designed to aid the infringing activities of its users
160
and, on that basis alone, should not be eligible for Sony’s protections.”
Finally, the district court found that the Supreme Court in Sony placed
great emphasis on “the district court’s finding that Sony had not
161
‘influenced or encouraged’ the unlawful copies.”
Consequently, the

154.
(1984)).
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
(1984)).

Id. at 653 (citing Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 654.
Id. (citing Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 438
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court held that the defendants in the case at bar went “to great lengths
to both influence and encourage the direct infringement among its
users” and, thus, listed the final grounds for rejecting the Staple
162
Defense.
Furthermore, the district court found that even if the plaintiffs failed
to demonstrate “a likelihood of success on the contributory
infringement claim,” the court would have found “a likelihood of
163
success on the vicarious infringement claim.”
Specifically, the
defendants “control[led] the access of Aimster’s users” and, thus, could
164
have terminated such access when users hosted infringing material.
Although, the defendants argued that their encryption scheme
prevented them from knowing users’ Internet protocol addresses, the
court held that the “right and ability to control” does not “require . . .
165
such precise identifying knowledge.”
In addition, the district court
identified the defendants’ direct financial interest in the underlying
infringing activity as including: (1) the monthly fee it received for Club
Aimster membership, (2) the donations it received for fighting the
recording industry, and (3) the sales from merchandise on Aimster’s
166
Web site.
The district court went on to discuss the defendants’ eligibility for
167
the liability safe harbors in the DMCA. First, the district court stated
168
that Aimster qualifies as a “service provider” under the DMCA.
Second, the court noted that the defendants adopted a “repeat infringer
policy”; however, the defendants never implemented the policy because
they claimed the encryption scheme kept them from discovering users
169
who actually transferred copyrighted files.
Nevertheless, the court
found that knowing a particular user’s Internet protocol address is not
necessary; “[r]ather, the statute merely provides that the service
provider implement a policy that provides for the termination of access
170
to repeat infringers in ‘appropriate circumstances.’” Accordingly, the

162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 655.
Id.
See id.
See id. at 656.
Id. at 657.
Id. at 659.
Id. (citing 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)).
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district court held that the DMCA did not provide a safe harbor for the
171
defendants.
The district court concluded by granting the plaintiffs’ motion for a
preliminary injunction; however, it requested that the plaintiffs draft
such injunctive language only to restrict the defendants’ contributorily
172
infringing activities, but not any noninfringing uses.
Nevertheless,
according to the Seventh Circuit, “[t]he district judge entered a broad
preliminary injunction, which had the effect of shutting down the
173
Aimster service.”
b. The Seventh Circuit’s Opinion
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s order granting the
174
preliminary injunction to the plaintiffs-appellees.
Even so, the
Seventh Circuit detailed its position on, inter alia, applying the Staple
175
Defense to contributory copyright liability.
The Seventh Circuit stated that “the producer of a product that has
substantial noninfringing uses is not a contributory infringer merely
176
because some of the uses actually made of the product are infringing.”
To illustrate, the court turned to Sony where, in that case, the Betamax
had three principal uses involving copying: (1) time-shifting, (2) “library
177
building,” and (3) commercial skipping.
The Seventh Circuit noted
that the Sony Court held that the first use was a fair use; however, the
second and third uses were, according to the Seventh Circuit,
“unquestionably infringing to the extent that the programs copied were
178
under copyright and the taping of them was not authorized.”
As a
result, customers were using the Betamax “for a mixture of infringing
and noninfringing uses and the [Supreme] Court thought that Sony
could not demix them because once Sony sold the [Betamax] it lost all
179
control over its use.”
Even though the majority in Sony did not discuss that Sony could
have developed the Betamax in a way that would have allowed
171. See id.
172. See id. at 666.
173. In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 645 (7th Cir. 2003).
174. See id. at 656.
175. See id. at 648.
176. Id. at 647 (citations omitted).
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 648 (citing Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,
438 (1984)).
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broadcasters to “scrambl[e] their signals to disable the Betamax from
recording their programs,” the Seventh Circuit noted that the court
would factor “the ability of a service provider to prevent its customers
180
from infringing” in determining contributory liability.
Still, the
181
Seventh Circuit stated that it would not be “a controlling factor.” For
instance, “[i]f a service facilitate[d] both infringing and noninfringing
uses . . . and the detection and prevention of the infringing uses would
be highly burdensome,” then recognizing the mere ability to prevent
infringement as a dispositive factor for denying application of the Staple
182
Defense would “result in the shutting down of the service.”
The Seventh Circuit noted that the majority in Sony “acknowledged
that 25 percent of Betamax users were fast forwarding through
commercials,” that is, the Betamax users were preparing infringing
183
derivative works.
Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit rejected the
plaintiffs-appellants’ claim that the Staple Defense does not apply to
alleged contributory infringers when there is “more than a mere
184
showing that a product may be used for infringing purposes.”
In
addition, the court rejected the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Napster “that
actual knowledge of specific infringing uses [was] a sufficient condition
185
for deeming a facilitator a contributory infringer.”
The court addressed the defendant-appellant’s argument that it
lacked sufficient knowledge for contributory infringement because
Aimster’s encryption scheme prevented the defendant-appellant from
actually knowing the content of any file transfer between the Aimster
186
users.
The court rejected this argument by stating that “[w]illful
blindness is knowledge, in copyright law . . . as it is in the law
187
generally.” The court was careful to avoid holding that a service’s use
of encryption would prohibit application of the Staple Defense, but that
“using encryption to shield itself from actual knowledge of the unlawful
purposes for which the service [was] being used” would prohibit such an
188
application.

180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
2000)).
186.
187.
188.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 648–49.
Id. at 649 (citing Sony, 464 U.S. at 452 n.36).
Id.
Id. (citing A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 1020 (N.D. Cal.
Id. at 650.
Id. (citing Louis Vuitton S.A. v. Lee, 875 F.2d 584, 590 (7th Cir. 1989)).
Id. at 650–51.
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With respect to the showing necessary for the Staple Defense, the
Seventh Circuit stated that the mere potential of noninfringing uses
would not satisfy the test; otherwise, almost all alleged contributory
infringers eligible for the Staple Defense “would be immune from
189
liability for contributory infringement.”
The Seventh Circuit
articulated that if such reasoning was inaccurate, the Supreme Court
would not “have thought it important to say that the Betamax was used
190
‘principally’ for time shifting.”
The court then listed the affirmative steps the defendant-appellant
took to invite copyright infringement of plaintiffs-appellees’ works,
191
including, for instance, the Guardian Tutorial and Club Aimster. The
court stated that such evidence is not dispositive toward rejecting the
Staple Defense; however, the defendant-appellant would bear the
“burden of production . . . to demonstrate that its service has substantial
192
noninfringing uses.” Although the Seventh Circuit listed five potential
noninfringing uses of Aimster, it rephrased the issue as to how
193
“probable” the occurrence of such uses would be. Consequently, the
defendant-appellant did not present any evidence to the
aforementioned issue because its encryption scheme prevented the
194
gathering of such evidence. As a result, the Seventh Circuit assumed
there was no evidence and, thus, held that the district court was correct
195
in its contributory infringement analysis.
c. Judge Posner’s Dicta
In dicta, the Seventh Circuit proposed a cost-benefit analysis to
summarize its discussion regarding the applicability of liability immunity
196
for “file-sharing service[s].”
Specifically, “[e]ven where there are
noninfringing uses, . . . if the infringing uses are substantial, then to
avoid liability as a contributory infringer the provider of the service
must show that it would have been disproportionately costly for him to
197
eliminate or at least reduce substantially the infringing uses.”
189.
190.
(1984)).
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

Id. at 651.
Id. (citing Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 421
See id. at 652.
Id. (citations omitted).
See id. at 653.
Id.
See id.
Id. (dicta).
Id. (dicta).
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3. Grokster: Promoting Use for Infringement
a. The District Court’s Opinion
In Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., the
plaintiffs owned the copyrights in much of the popular American
198
musical recordings and compositions.
The defendants provided two
distinct software programs for connecting users via peer-to-peer
199
networks. Because the parties did not dispute any material facts, both
200
The plaintiffs claimed that
parties moved for summary judgment.
defendants contributorily and vicariously infringed their copyrights and
201
the defendants denied that they were eligible for such liabilities.
202
Both technologies had inherent similarities. For instance, Internet
users could freely download either software program—StreamCast or
Grokster—from the Web site of the defendant that developed the
203
particular software program.
The users would then install the
program that they downloaded and would designate which files they
204
wanted to share with other users. Next, the users would execute the
software program and “automatically connect[] to a peer-to-peer
network (FastTrack in Grokster’s case; Gnutella in the case of
205
Morpheus).” All files that the users designated for sharing would be
available to all other users connected to the respective peer-to-peer
206
network.
The users were able to search for specific files that
“match[ed] the search criteria” and then “click on a specific listing to
initiate a direct transfer from the source computer to the requesting
207
user’s computer.”
Once downloaded, an identical replica of the
208
original file existed on the requesting user’s computer.
Moreover, “[m]ultiple . . . uploads . . . or . . . downloads . . . [could]
209
occur simultaneously to and from a single user’s computer.”
Furthermore, neither StreamCast nor Grokster “operate[d] a
198. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1031–
32 (C.D. Cal. 2003), aff’d, 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004), vacated, 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
199. See id.
200. See id. at 1031.
201. See id.
202. See id. at 1031–33, 1039–41.
203. See id. at 1032.
204. See id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 1032–33.
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centralized file-sharing [or indexing] network.”
That is, when users
searched for or transferred files with either a Grokster or StreamCast
client, no data traveled through any computers or servers under the
211
defendants’ control or ownership.
In addition, both software
programs had additional features for “organizing, viewing and playing
212
media files, and for communicating with other users.”
213
The technologies, however, had many differences.
For instance,
Grokster licensed a proprietary software technology and did not have
access to the source code; therefore, it lacked the means to “alter it in
214
any way.” Grokster did have the ability to change the “start page” of
the software client “and provide advertising automatically received by
215
the Grokster client software.”
In contrast, StreamCast “owned and
controlled” its proprietary software program and, thus, “has access to
216
Moreover,
the source code . . . to modify the software at will.”
Grokster’s peer-to-peer technology operated through “a two-tiered
217
organizational structure, with groups of nodes clustered around a
218
219
A user who ran
single supernode” to enable network access.
Grokster would immediately be connected to the network via a
supernode and all search requests and results would be “relayed among
supernodes, maximizing the breadth of the search pool and minimizing
220
redundancy in search traffic.” Grokster was “preset with a list of ‘root
supernodes’ . . . . While Grokster may briefly have had some control
over a root supernode, [p]laintiffs [did] not dispute that Grokster no
221
longer operate[d] such a supernode.”
In contrast, StreamCast
operated through a one-tiered organizational structure whereby
StreamCast clients would bounce search requests “from user to user
222
until a match [was] found or the search request expire[d].”
210. Id. at 1039.
211. Id. at 1040–41.
212. Id. at 1033.
213. See id. at 1039–41.
214. Id. at 1039.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 1041.
217. The term “node” means “an end-point on the Internet, typically a user’s
computer.” Id. at 1040.
218. The term “supernode” means “a node that has a heightened function,
accumulating information from numerous other nodes.” Id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 1041.
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To commence its infringement analysis, the district court noted that
it was “undisputed” that “at least some” users of both the defendants’
software programs distributed and reproduced the plaintiffs’
copyrighted works; therefore, the requisite underlying direct
223
infringement existed for continuing its secondary liability analysis.
For contributory infringement, the court rephrased the knowledge
inquiry as requiring the defendants to have had “actual knowledge of
specific infringement [not the general occurrence of infringement] . . . at
a time when either [d]efendant materially contribute[d] to the alleged
224
infringement, and [could] therefore do something about it.”
The
district court reasoned that Grokster and StreamCast had “substantial
noninfringing uses,” such as:
distributing movie trailers, free songs or other non-copyrighted
works; using the software in countries where it is
legal; . . . sharing the works of Shakespeare[; and] . . . search[ing]
for public domain materials, government documents, media
content for which distribution is authorized, . . . and computer
225
software for which distribution is permitted.
Thus, by following the Ninth Circuit’s language in Napster, the district
court concluded that “[a]bsent any specific information which identifies
infringing activity, a computer system operator cannot be held liable for
contributory infringement merely because the structure of the system
226
allows for the exchange of copyrighted material.”
Accordingly, the
district court’s analysis continued to address “whether Grokster and
StreamCast [did] anything, aside from distributing software, to actively
facilitate—or whether they could [have done] anything to stop—their
227
users’ infringing activity.”
The district court concluded that
defendants did not contribute to any of their users’ infringing activity
because neither defendant provided any centralized server for
facilitating any searches or transfers of data on the peer-to-peer
228
networks.
In short, “[if] either [d]efendant closed their doors and
deactivated all computers within their control, users of their products
229
could continue sharing files with little or no interruption.” Moreover,

223. Id. at 1034.
224. Id. at 1038.
225. Id. at 1035–36.
226. Id. at 1036 (quoting A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1021 (9th
Cir. 2001)).
227. Id. at 1039.
228. Id. at 1041.
229. Id.
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whether the defendants had the ability to “communicate” with and
“provide updates” to their users “says nothing about whether
[d]efendants facilitate[d] or enable[d] the exchange of copyrighted files
230
at issue in these cases.”
For vicarious liability, although the court concluded that the
defendants both received financial benefits through advertising money
as a result of users flocking to their software programs, “there [was] no
admissible evidence before the [c]ourt [that] indicat[ed] that
[[d]efendants [had] the ability to supervise and control the infring[ing]
conduct (all of which occur[ed] after the product has passed to end
231
users).”
Therefore, the district court held that the defendants were
232
not vicariously liable.
b. The Ninth Circuit’s Opinion
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment, which
granted the defendants’ motions for summary judgment and denied the
233
plaintiffs’ motions for summary judgment. The Ninth Circuit accepted
234
all of the district court’s reasoning.
c. The Supreme Court’s Opinion
i. The Majority’s Opinion
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and after much discussion of
235
the case’s history, the majority opinion focused in on Sony.
The
majority noted that, “[a]lthough Sony’s advertisements urged consumers
to buy the [Betamax] to ‘record favorite shows’ or ‘build a library’ of
recorded programs, . . . neither of these uses was necessarily
236
infringing.”
Accordingly, “with no evidence of stated or indicated
intent to promote infringing uses, the only conceivable basis for
imposing liability was on a theory of contributory infringement” finding
that Sony had “knowledge that some would use [the Betamax] to

230. Id. at 1042.
231. Id. at 1043–45.
232. See id. at 1046.
233. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir.
2003), vacated, 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
234. See id.
235. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 931
(2005).
236. Id. (quoting Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 459
(1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)); see Sony, 464 U.S. at 424, 454–55.
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237

infringe.” However, the majority noted that the Court in Sony did not
find Sony liable because the Betamax “was ‘capable of commercially
238
significant noninfringing uses.’”
The majority then criticized the Ninth Circuit’s and district court’s
views of Sony, describing them as “error” and holding that it was
incorrect “to grant summary judgment to the [defendants-respondents]
239
on [plaintiffs-petitioners’] inducement claim.” Moreover, the majority
240
refused “to add a more quantified description” of the Staple Defense.
However, the majority did state that “where evidence goes beyond” a
product’s characteristics or the knowledge that it may be put to
infringing uses and shows statements or actions directed to promoting
infringement—that is, taking “active steps . . . to encourage direct
241
infringement”—Sony’s Staple Defense will not preclude liability.
Such promotion of infringement may be evidenced, for instance, by
“advertising an infringing use, . . . instructing how to engage in an
infringing use,” or “show[ing] an affirmative intent that the product be
242
used to infringe [or] that infringement was encouraged.” As a result,
the majority reasoned that it brought “the inducement rule” into
copyright law “[f]or the same reasons that Sony took the staple-article
243
doctrine [from] patent law.”
The majority reinforced its new stance by “holding that one who
distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to infringe
copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken
to foster infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by
244
third parties.”
Furthermore, the majority explained that “mere
knowledge of infringing potential or of actual infringing uses would not
245
be enough [in this case] to subject a distributor to liability.”
The
majority was careful to list acts that were “incident[al] to product
distribution,” for example, “offering customers technical support or

237. Id. (citing Sony, 464 U.S. at 439).
238. Id. (quoting Sony, 464 U.S. at 442).
239. Id. at 934.
240. See id.
241. Id. at 935–36 (quoting Oak Indus., Inc. v. Zenith Elecs. Corp., 697 F. Supp. 988, 992
(N.D. Ill. 1998)).
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 936–37.
245. Id. at 937.
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product updates,” and not steps of inducement—that is “purposeful,
246
culpable expression and conduct.”
Next, the majority listed the affirmative steps that the defendantsrespondents took to induce users to infringe the plaintiffs-petitioners’
247
copyrights.
Specifically, the majority found that Grokster did the
following: (1) “distributed an electronic newsletter containing links to
articles promoting its software’s ability to access popular copyrighted
music”; (2) released a program called “Swaptor,” which made Napster
software compatible with its peer-to-peer networks; (3) edited the meta
tags in its Web site’s html code to attract Web surfers searching for
“Napster” vis-à-vis search engines; and (4) “Grokster’s name . . . [was]
248
apparently derived from Napster.”
Likewise, StreamCast (1)
advertised “OpenNap,” which was its version of “Swaptor”; and (2) sent
internal memorandums expressing their intentions to snag Napster’s
249
users.
In addition, the majority found that the defendantsrespondents’ failure to implement tools, which prevented infringement,
“underscore[d] . . . [their] intentional facilitation of their users’
250
infringement.”
Moreover, the majority gave credence to the fact that the
defendants-respondents’ business model depended on revenues from
251
“high-volume use,” which was directly caused by infringing use. The
majority noted that this factor alone was insufficient to find inducement,
252
“but viewed in the context of the entire record its import [was] clear.”
In particular, it showed that the defendants-respondents had an
253
“unlawful objective.”
ii. Justice Ginsburg’s Concurring Opinion
Justices Rehnquist and Kennedy joined Justice Ginsburg in her
254
concurring opinion.
Justice Ginsburg made the point that “the
evidence was insufficient to demonstrate . . . a reasonable prospect that
substantial or commercially significant noninfringing uses were likely to

246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.

Id.
See id. at 937–40.
Id. at 938–39.
Id. at 939.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 942 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
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255

develop over time.”
Accordingly, Justice Ginsburg stated that the
Ninth Circuit’s and district court’s finding that Grokster and StreamCast
256
were capable of substantial noninfringing uses was incorrect.
iii. Justice Breyer’s Concurring Opinion
Justices Stevens and O’Connor joined Justice Breyer in his
257
concurring opinion. First, Justice Breyer agreed with the majority that
active inducement was enough to find “the distributor of a dual-use
258
259
technology” liable. Next, Justice Breyer addressed Sony. He noted
that “of all the taping actually done by Sony’s customers, only around
260
9% was of the sort the Court referred to as authorized.”
Likewise,
Justice Breyer found that the “10% [of uses] that apparently [were]
noninfringing [were] very similar to the 9% or so of authorized time261
shifting uses of the” Betamax.
Moreover, in giving weight to the word “capable,” Justice Breyer
stated “that a figure like 10%, if fixed for all time, might well prove
insufficient, but that such a figure serve[d] as an adequate foundation
where there [was] a reasonable prospect of expanded legitimate uses
262
over time.”
Next, he listed many of Grokster’s and SteamCast’s
“legitimate noninfringing uses,” and Justice Breyer could “find nothing
in the record that suggest[ed] that this course of events would not
continue to flow naturally as a consequence of the character of the
software taken together with the foreseeable development of the
263
Internet and of information technology.” Furthermore, Justice Breyer
concluded that “the foreseeable development of such uses, when taken
together with an estimated 10% noninfringing material, [was] sufficient
264
to meet Sony’s standard.” Finally, Justice Breyer noted that the Court
265
should not alter the Staple Defense.

255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.

Id. at 948.
Id. at 948–49.
See id. at 949 (Breyer, J., concurring).
Id.
See id.
Id. at 951.
Id. at 952.
Id. at 953.
Id. at 954–55.
Id.
Id. at 965.
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II. A LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL
A. Text of This Author’s Proposed Bill
A BILL
To amend chapter 5 of title 17, United States Code, relating to the
Staple Article of Commerce Doctrine of copyright law, and for other
purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the “Innovation Promotion and Copyright
Protection Act of 2007.”
SEC. 2. THE STAPLE DEFENSE.
Section 501 of title 17, United States Code, is amended by adding at the
end the following:
(g) One who sells or distributes a product or service shall avoid
secondary copyright liability if, after ninety days of distribution
or sale of said product or service, sixty-six percent or more of the
alleged secondarily infringing product’s or service’s uses are
noninfringing.
(h) One who sells or distributes a product or service shall be
presumed to avoid secondary copyright liability if, after ninety
days of distribution or sale of said product or service, ten percent
or more of the alleged secondarily infringing product’s or
service’s uses are noninfringing and one demonstrates that within
six years, sixty-six percent or more of the alleged secondarily
infringing product’s or service’s uses will be noninfringing.
(1) This presumption shall be rebutted by a copyright owner
if said copyright owner makes a showing that
(i) after three years of the product’s or service’s sale or
distribution, more than sixty-seven percent of the
product’s or service’s uses are infringing; or
(ii) after six years of the product’s or service’s sale or
distribution, more than thirty-four percent of the
product’s or service’s uses are infringing.
(i) The statute of limitations for all actions under the Copyright
Act shall toll during this six-year period for copyright actions
where the alleged infringer affirms the Staple Defense any time
within the six-year period aforementioned in subsection (h).

REESE COMMENT

2007]

FIXING THROUGH LEGISLATIVE FIXATION

477

(j) This affirmative defense shall not be available to any seller or
distributor of a product or service who invites others to infringe
copyright protection vis-à-vis said seller’s or distributor’s product
or service.
(1) One invites others to infringe by advertising an infringing
use, instructing how to engage in an infringing use, or
showing an affirmative intent that the product be used to
infringe.
(k) If a court grants an alleged secondary infringer safe harbor
under subsection (h) and, in a later action, said alleged secondary
infringer is found liable for secondary liability because the
copyright owner rebutted the presumption to avoid liability in
the prior action under subsection (h)(1), then statutory damages
for said liability shall be trebled.
(l) In this section, the terms “secondary copyright liability” and
“secondary liability” mean contributory infringement or
vicarious liability in copyright law as described by the current
judicial doctrine.
B. Legislative Intent of Proposed Bill
After twenty-six years of case law, the current state of the Staple
Defense is still uncertain and, more importantly, its future is unclear.
First, the Sony Court, in a five to four decision, presented the broad
266
principle, which was the initial embodiment of the Staple Defense. In
unambiguous cases such as Vault Corp., where all current uses were
found to be legal uses, applying the broad principle in Sony was
267
frictionless. However, in cases where potential uses were present, but
current infringement rates were high, the judiciary has struggled with
applying the broad Sony principle on its own and, accordingly, has
268
added its own ingredients into the recipe. The Supreme Court should
have followed its own advice: “Sound policy, as well as history, supports
our consistent deference to Congress when major technological

266. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 431 (1984) (5-4
decision).
267. See Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 258 (5th Cir. 1988).
268. See, e.g., Grokster, 545 U.S. 913 (adding an inducement exception to the Staple
Defense); id. at 947–48 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (advocating to retain a case-by-case
application of the broad Sony principle); id. at 952–53 (Breyer, J., concurring) (stating that a
rate of ten percent in current noninfringing uses plus the reasonable prospect of more
legitimate uses over time was sufficient to satisfy the Sony principle); In re Aimster Copyright
Litig., 252 F. Supp. 2d 634 (N.D. Ill. 2002), aff’d, 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003) (dicta) (adding a
cost-benefit analysis to Sony’s Staple Defense).
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innovations alter the market for copyrighted materials. Congress has
the constitutional authority and the institutional ability to accommodate
fully the varied permutations of competing interests that are inevitably
269
implicated by such new technology.” The proposed legislation intends
to avoid the aforementioned uncertainty by passing a bright-line rule
that balances the copyright law’s policies, while maintaining the
prospective viewpoint the Staple Defense currently embodies by
implementing specific benchmarks for blossoming technologies to reach.
Moreover, the proposed Innovation Promotion and Copyright
Protection Act of 2007 (IPCP Act) does not overlap with proposed
legislation and perpetuates a consistent approach for judicial application
of the Staple Defense.
1. Bright-Line Rules Are Better than Uncertain Broad Principles
Bright-line rules “are fairer than standards [in] that rules require
270
decisionmakers to act consistently, treating like cases alike.”
In
particular, “rules reduce the danger of official arbitrariness or bias by
preventing decisionmakers from factoring the parties’ particular
271
attractive or unattractive qualities into the decisionmaking calculus.”
Moreover, “rules afford certainty and predictability to private actors,
272
enabling them to order their affairs productively.”
In contrast,
“[s]tandards produce uncertainty, thereby chilling socially productive
273
behavior.”
Standards do, however, allow decisionmakers great
flexibility in rendering their decisions and thus standards “spare
274
individuals from being sacrificed on the altar of rules.”
Professor Lawrence Lessig best answered the conundrum of whether
the courts should continue to decide the fate of the peer-to-peer
technology or whether Congress should pass decisive rules to make the
determinations:
If the answer is Congress, then innovators at least know their
enemy. Wars about liability get voted on; any resulting liability
is usually prospective. But if the answer is the courts, then
innovators are forever at the mercy of enterprising lawyers. It
269. Sony, 464 U.S. at 431.
270. Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22,
62 (1992); see also Renée Lettow Lerner, The Worldwide Popular Revolt Against
Proportionality in Self-Defense Law, 2 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y (forthcoming 2007).
271. Sullivan, supra note 270, at 62.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id. at 66.
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takes nothing to ensnarl a startup in death-inducing legal bills, at
275
least when the legal standard is uncertain.
2. Balancing the Policies of Copyright Law
Copyright legislation causes more harm than good if it does not
properly balance the competing policies that copyright law is intended
to serve. Accordingly, this Comment explores both the traditional
copyright law policies and those policies that have been molded out of
technology’s entrance into the copyright realm.
The U.S. Constitution gives “Congress . . . [the] Power . . . To
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
276
Writings and Discoveries.”
The drafters clearly implemented an
economic basis for copyright protection that was in great contrast to the
European view that authors had an inherent, inalienable, personal right
277
to their works. In fact,
[t]he economic philosophy behind the clause . . . is the conviction
that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the
best way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors
and inventors in ‘Science and useful Arts.’ Sacrificial days
devoted to such creative activities deserve rewards
278
commensurate with the services rendered.
Although the first purpose of the clause—and, thus, copyright law—is to
“foster the creation and dissemination of intellectual works for the
public welfare,” the secondary goal is “[t]o give authors the reward due
279
them for their contribution to society.”
Therefore, “the interests of
280
authors must yield to the public welfare where they conflict.”
Furthermore, “[i]n enacting a copyright law, Congress must
consider . . . two questions:
First, how much will the legislation
stimulate the producer and so benefit the public, and second, how much
281
will the monopoly granted be detrimental to the public?”
275. Lawrence Lessig, A Rotten Ruling, WIRED MAG., Sept. 1, 2005, at 7, available at
http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/13.09/posts.html?pg=7.
276. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 8.
277. See Viktor Mayer-Schönberger, In Search of the Story: Narratives of Intellectual
Property, 10 VA. J.L. & TECH. 11, ¶ 15 (2005).
278. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
279. STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 87TH CONG., COPYRIGHT LAW
REVISION: REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF
THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW 3–6 (1961) [hereinafter COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION REPORT].
280. Id.
281. Id.
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These policies have been more narrowly defined in the contexts of
secondary liability and the application of the Staple Defense.
Specifically, “a finding of contributory infringement is normally the
functional equivalent of holding that the disputed article is within the
282
monopoly granted to the patentee.”
The Staple Defense, a legal
device that shrinks the reach of the copyright holder’s protection, “must
strike a balance between a copyright holder’s legitimate demand for
effective—not merely symbolic—protection of the statutory monopoly,
and the rights of others freely to engage in substantially unrelated areas
283
of commerce.”
The Supreme Court folded “[t]he inducement rule”
into the Staple Defense because such a rule “premises liability on
purposeful, culpable expression and conduct, and thus does nothing to
compromise legitimate commerce or discourage innovation having a
284
lawful promise.” In sum, protecting authors’ rights must be balanced
with allowing new technologies to flourish, whereas too much protection
would result in a “chilling effect” on innovation and too little protection
285
would diminish the incentive for authors to create new works.
Accordingly, this Comment addresses how the IPCP Act balances
the aforementioned policy issues. First, the IPCP Act offers added
286
bonuses to authors. In particular, a copyright owner may claim triple
the damages that he or she could claim today if a manufacturer of a new
technology takes safe harbor within the IPCP Act, but does not meet
future noninfringement benchmarks within the three and six-year
periods. In addition, if the manufacturer invites others to infringe vis-àvis its technology, then that manufacturer waives its ability to affirm the
codified Staple Defense. These additions to the copyright owner’s
rights will not extend the copyright owner’s monopoly to a point where
it is detrimental to the public because the IPCP Act will stall litigation
against new technologies, allowing the new technology to flourish,
unless the amount of infringement is unreasonable—as defined by set
infringement to noninfringement ratios. If the new technology turns
into a bastion of piracy, then triple damages compensate the copyright
owner for his or her patience. If the new technology develops into a
282. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 441 (1984) (5-4
decision).
283. Id. at 442.
284. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 937 (2005).
285. See Dan Pontes, Rewinding Sony: Can the Supreme Court and Big Media Grok
P2P?, 9 INTELL. PROP. L. BULL. 159, 160 (2005).
286. For purposes of policy analysis, this Comment shall refer to authors and copyright
owners interchangeably.
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legitimately used one, then the technology developer benefits by having
a lucrative asset and the copyright owner benefits by having a new
technological medium to legitimately disseminate or reproduce his or
her works.
Likewise, manufacturers of new technologies receive added
incentives. Specifically, the IPCP Act offers an affirmative defense to
vicarious liability, whereas, before the IPCP Act, the Staple Defense
only applied to contributory infringement claims. Furthermore, the
IPCP Act offers set grace periods for technology to develop; however,
during these periods there are limitations on the proportion of
infringement that may occur. These limits shrink over time so as to
minimize the harm to copyright owners. From a financial perspective,
the flow of venture capital will increase into these technologies because
careful business and technical planning can ensure that the technology
keeps infringement within the lawful limits and, therefore, will make
technologies such as peer-to-peer networking more attractive to
potential financiers.
Although the manufacturers of new technologies may come out
slightly ahead of the copyright owners in the benefits they receive from
the IPCP Act, “the interests of authors must yield to the public welfare
287
where they conflict.” The public demands new technologies—as the
authors do to disseminate their own works—and these demands must be
met in a way that does as little damage as possible to copyright owners.
Consequently, these added benefits to technology developers do not
devalue the authors’ copyrights because direct infringement claims are
still available to copyright owners and the DMCA grants copyright
owners a windfall by remaining a powerful tool for them to use
technology to protect their works by denying unauthorized access to
third parties even if said third parties were attempting to execute a fair
use of such works. Finally, it should not be discounted that both the
copyright owners and the technology developers will benefit from a
more predictable and certain legal standard. Accordingly, the copyright
owners’ legal counsels will be able to more easily gauge when it is
proper to bring litigation for secondary liability and the technology
developers’ business planners will be able to ensure that safeguards exist
in the technology to prevent widespread illegitimate uses.

287. COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION REPORT, supra note 279, at 3–6.
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3. The Proposed Legislation Does Not Abandon the Weight Given to
Potential Uses
The proposed legislation takes into account the potential uses new
technologies may have by slowly increasing the safe harbor
requirements—the
infringement
to
noninfringement
ratio
benchmarks—over a six-year period. The intent behind this six-year
period was that it was a long enough duration for society to realize
whether the technology will become desirable—that is, have significant
noninfringing uses. At the outset, society will be willing to accept more
infringement, but as time progresses to the close of the six-year period,
society’s patience lessens; specifically, it will only bear thirty-four
percent infringing uses.
Furthermore, the intent behind the
infringement to noninfringement ratios is to maintain some consistency
with the twenty-six years of judicial doctrine.
The first safe harbor—that after ninety days of distribution or sale,
at least sixty-six percent of uses must be noninfringing—stems from
Justice Stevens’s reasoning in Sony that authorized time-shifting was a
288
substantial enough use to justify applying the Staple Defense.
As
aforementioned, the floor of the range of authorized time-shifting was
approximately sixty-six percent and the amount of authorized timeshifting—although not expressly calculated by the majority—was
sufficient to satisfy the Staple Defense on its own without any other
289
legitimate uses of the device. There was no consideration of whether
the amount of television programs that authorized time-shifting would
increase over time, rather the Court found that the defendantspetitioners established a substantial likelihood that a “substantial”
amount of copyright owners “would not object to having their
290
broadcasts time-shifted by private reviewers.”
Consequently, the
IPCP Act sets the benchmark for its most accommodating safe harbor
to technologies that have at least sixty-six percent noninfringing uses.
The author concedes that most infringement to noninfringement ratios
will be somewhat arbitrary; however, this rate is consistent with Sony
and it seems that technologies that have legitimate uses equal to
approximately two-thirds of their total uses are the types of technologies
291
that the Supreme Court contemplated the Staple Defense to protect.
After all, if the bar is raised much higher, the need and application for
288.
289.
290.
291.

See Sony, 464 U.S. at 442.
See id.
Id. at 456.
See id. at 440–41.
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such an affirmative defense would restrict the evolution of new
technologies. Moreover, because the IPCP Act does not apply the
Staple Defense to technologies that innovators invite third parties to use
to infringe copyrights, the probability that individuals would form
Napster-like businesses with safeguards to ensure that only thirty-three
percent of content is copyright protected would be very low. That is, at
a minimum those individuals would have to advertise this fact to third
parties in order to make their technology popular for such purposes, and
those individuals would have internal memoranda and business plans
reflecting such nefarious goals.
The second safe harbor—that after ninety days of distribution of
sale, at least ten percent of uses must be noninfringing—accepts Justice
Breyer’s reasoning in Grokster that “the foreseeable development of
[noninfringing] uses, when taken together with an estimated 10%
292
noninfringing material, is sufficient to meet Sony’s standard.”
This
safe harbor also requires that the alleged secondary infringer put forth
evidence, such as business plans and market research reports, that he or
she will reach the final infringement to noninfringement ratio at the end
of six years. This requirement ensures that Justice Breyer’s test of the
current infringement rate is proper to use as a benchmark to measure a
technology’s potential. After all, a technology that has only ten percent
noninfringing uses and no plan to improve that rate—or other evidence
that the rate will improve—is not socially desirable. This is not the end
of the story, however, because after three years, the safe harbor will
only remain available to technologies that have thirty-three percent
noninfringing uses, and after six years, the safe harbor will only remain
available to technologies that have sixty-six percent noninfringing uses.
The intent behind the required ratio after six years is the same as that of
the first safe harbor. The thirty-three percent noninfringing uses after
three years is merely the halfway benchmark to the requirements after
six years.
The aggregate effect of such safe harbors is in harmony with the
policy behind the Staple Defense as evidenced by a consistency in the
Sony and Grokster decisions, which emphasized the potential of a
293
device.
The case law could have developed in a much different

292. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 955 (2005)
(Breyer, J., concurring).
293. See id. at 931 (majority opinion) (quoting Sony, 464 U.S. at 441); Sony, 464 U.S. at
441 (determining whether the device was “capable of commercially significant noninfringing
uses”).

REESE COMMENT

484 MARQUETTE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 11:2
294

direction if the four dissenting justices in Sony had prevailed.
In
particular, the dissent called for a modified Staple Defense, which only
295
takes into account current uses of the allegedly infringing device.
Although this would greatly simplify the judiciary’s analysis, the test
that the dissenting justices advocated for would suppress many new
technologies.
Often new technologies are developed for one use, but, over time,
become commercially successful for alternate uses. In fact, many
products have become commercially successful because of newly
296
discovered uses for those already existing products.
Above all,
copyright law had its own immaculate reception: Sony—although it was
the work of the Supreme Court and not Franco Harris and Terry
297
Bradshaw. Specifically, the Court noted that the Betamax technology
would spawn a time-shifting revolution and because such use—also its
principal use—was fair, the Staple Defense would protect said
298
technology. At the time the Court decided the case, “the industry was
unsure how great the demand would be for prerecorded tapes compared
to time shifting” so the “Betamax played one-hour tapes,” which were
“long enough for most television broadcasts but too short for a feature
299
film.” The Betamax’s competition distributed VHS technology, which
had a “longer playing time” and “contributed to VHS’s eventual
300
displacement of Betamax.”
This opened up an entirely new market
for the motion picture industry, which emphasizes why it is important to
301
give credence to “potential” noninfringing uses.
Moreover, if the
Court had found time-shifting to be infringement—that is, not a fair
use—then an entire domestic industry’s progression could have been
slowed or hindered. Accordingly, the IPCP Act is written to protect, for
example, the start-up company’s software program that the company
developed for a legitimate use, but that became popular and widely
disseminated for third-parties’ illegitimate uses, provided that the

294. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 491 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
295. See id.
296. See, e.g., George J. Annas, Faith (Healing), Hope and Charity at the FDA: The
Politics of AIDS Drug Trials, 34 VILL. L. REV. 771, 788 n.57 (1989) (noting that Zidovudine
was an ineffective cancer drug that many years later became the first federally approved
AIDS drug).
297. See Sony, 464 U.S. 417.
298. See id. at 421.
299. In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 650 (7th Cir. 2003).
300. Id.
301. Id.
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company then took steps to ensure that the legitimate uses govern and
dominate. In sum, the IPCP Act is not only for the businesses that
intend legitimate uses for their products and put safeguards into their
devices or systems to prevent infringement; it also serves to protect the
devices or systems that, by chance, become popular for infringing uses
as long as the technology developer then ensures that legitimate uses
become substantial—that is, reach the infringement ratio benchmarks
over the six-year period after the product’s initial release.
4. Specific Times, Limits, and Infringement Ratios Define Whether or
Not Technologies Are Socially Desirable
The Supreme Court found justification for importing secondary
liability into copyright law by applying broad principles often used to
302
settle similarly fashioned disputes in most other areas of tort law. This
author looks to other areas of the law for justifying liability against
manufacturers of products, which may have some legitimate uses, but
those uses are far outweighed by socially undesirable uses.
Traditional tort law has long punished the manufacturers of products
that had some socially desirable uses, but were “unreasonably
303
dangerous” to consumers.
For instance, section 402A of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts states:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition
unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his
property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused
to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a
product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer
without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation
and sale of his product, and

302. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 435 (citing Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros., 222 U.S. 55, 63 (1911)
(holding the defendant liable on principles recognized in every part of the law)) (noting that
vicarious liability is imposed in virtually all areas of the law, and the concept of contributory
infringement is merely a species of the broader problem of when to hold one individual
accountable for the actions of another).
303. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. b (1965) (historical
discussion of such strict liability).
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(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or
304
entered into any contractual relation with the seller.
The comment to the Restatement states that where the
manufacturer “has reason to anticipate that danger may result from a
particular use . . . he may be required to give adequate warning of the
danger . . . and a product sold without such warning is in a defective
305
condition.”
By providing adequate warning, the manufacturer takes
affirmative steps to prevent harm caused by its product. Regretfully, a
consumer has more incentive to abide by a warning that affects said
consumer’s well-being than a consumer who is warned that his or her
actions may economically harm a third-party copyright holder. By
analogy, a technology developer must safeguard his or her product to
prevent its users from infringing via said product in order to retain
eligibility in the IPCP Act’s safe harbors. Even if there are minimal
noninfringing uses—that is, up to ten percent—at the outset of the
development, the developer must either rely on fate or take affirmative
steps to ensure that the harm caused to copyright holders does not
exceed a minimum point over time—thirty-four percent infringing uses.
Proper business and technical planning allows the technology developer
to keep control over his or her product to minimize harm to copyright
holders. Furthermore, the technology developer needs not to fear
asserting such control, as the IPCP Act provides an absolute safe harbor
from secondary copyright liability as long as he or she abides by the safe
harbor provisions.
To explain the reasonableness of the IPCP Act, analogies must be
drawn. For example, if ninety percent of vaccine users died, then the
vaccine should be kept around for future development, but only under a
306
watchful eye. If after years of research and development, the fatality
rate significantly decreases, then it becomes socially desirable.
Likewise, if a dog bites its owner as a puppy, it is forgiven; however,
when that puppy grows into a dog and it repeats the same behavior, it
needs to be put down. Moreover, if that dog bites the neighbors—third
parties—then the dog’s social desirability becomes even less. This is the
concept that is echoed in the IPCP Act.

304. Id. § 402A.
305. Id. § 402A cmt. h.
306. Although vaccines may qualify as “[u]navoidably unsafe products,” the
Restatement still requires proper warning to parties that may be harmed by the product. See
id. § 402A cmt. k.
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Aside from the aforementioned Restatement provision, courts have
subjected manufacturers to liability when their products are chiefly used
307
for nefarious purposes and, thus, were socially undesirable.
For
example, Maryland’s highest court held that if “the trier of fact
determines that a handgun is a Saturday Night Special, then liability
may be imposed against a manufacturer or anyone else in the marketing
chain, including the retailer . . . when the plaintiff or plaintiff’s decedent
suffers injury or death because he is shot with the Saturday Night
308
Special” as part of “a criminal act.”
The term “Saturday Night Special” refers to “a particular category
of small, cheap handguns,” which are “regularly used in criminal
309
activity.”
An academic wrote that because these guns are “easily
concealable and relatively inexpensive,” they “pose a great risk of
criminal misuse” and, therefore, “any countervailing social usefulness is
negligible because the poor quality of their manufacture precludes their
310
use for most legitimate purposes.”
Furthermore, alternative guns
serve the “legitimate uses, while not posing the same danger of criminal
311
misuse.” The court reasoned that “the manufacturer or marketer of a
Saturday Night Special knows or ought to know that the chief use of the
product is for criminal activity,” and “[s]uch criminal use, and the virtual
absence of legitimate uses for the product, [were] clearly foreseeable by
312
the manufacturers and sellers of” the product.
Like the manufacturers of Saturday Night Specials, Napster,
Aimster, Grokster, and Streamcast “kn[ew] or ought to [have] know[n]
313
that the chief use of the product[s] [was] for” illegitimate activity.
Such knowledge was established by, inter alia, actual knowledge of
infringement, their advertising campaigns for users to download their
software programs to get access to copyrighted works, and internal
314
memoranda. The difference between these peer-to-peer networks and
Saturday Night Specials is the potential for “legitimate uses for the
307. See, e.g., Kelley v. R.G. Indus., Inc., 497 A.2d 1143 (Md. 1985).
308. Id. at 1160.
309. Id. at 1146.
310. Id. at 1158–59 (citations omitted).
311. Id. (citations omitted).
312. Id. at 1159 (citations omitted).
313. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 936–37
(2005); In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 650 (7th Cir. 2003); A&M Records, Inc.
v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114
F. Supp. 2d 896, 918, 920–21 (N.D. Cal. 2000)); Kelley, 497 A.2d at 1159.
314. See Grokster, 545 U.S. at 936–37; In re Aimster, 334 F.3d at 650; Napster, 239 F.3d
at 1022 (citing Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 918, 920–21).
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product.”
If the court made a finding that Saturday Night Specials
were primarily used by poor individuals and shopkeepers for selfdefense and defense of their properties, then the court would likely have
overlooked the criminal activity associated with the guns. Accordingly,
the IPCP Act allows for technologies, like peer-to-peer networks, to
flourish and establish themselves as legitimately used products. In
short, the technology developer needs to aim to be more like Colt
Firearms Company and less like a Saturday Night Special manufacturer.
In particular, society is willing to allow large portions of infringement in
the blossoming years of a new technology as long as that technology’s
business model is not based on infringement and the technology
developer does not advertise its use as a tool of infringement. Then,
after a set period of time—three years and six years—and as long as the
proportion of legitimate uses to illegitimate uses increases—eventually
achieving a proportion of sixty-six percent noninfringing uses to thirtyfour percent infringing uses—society will embrace the new technology
and will not punish the developer of it because a minority of third
parties illegitimately use the technology. This is analogous to society’s
embrace of non-Saturday Night Special firearms because of their
legitimate uses for hunting, self-defense, and defense of one’s property,
even though said firearms are often used by criminals.
5. Other Proposed Legislation Has Not Addressed the Issues
Addressed in the Legislation Proposed Here
Senator Orrin Hatch introduced the Inducing Infringement of
316
Copyrights Act of 2004, but the bill died during that session in
317
committee. The bill read as follows:
Section 501 of title 17, United States Code, is amended by adding
at the end the following:
(g)(1) In this subsection, the term ‘intentionally induces’
means intentionally aids, abets, induces, or procures, and
intent may be shown by acts from which a reasonable person
would find intent to induce infringement based upon all
relevant information about such acts then reasonably
available to the actor, including whether the activity relies on
infringement for its commercial viability.

315. See Kelley, 497 A.2d at 1159 (citations omitted).
316. Inducing Infringement of Copyrights Act of 2004, S. 2560, 108th Cong. (2004).
317. See 150 CONG. REC. S7174-02 (daily ed. June 22, 2004) (bill proposed by Sen.
Hatch).
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(2) Whoever intentionally induces any violation identified
in subsection (a) shall be liable as an infringer.
(3) Nothing in this subsection shall enlarge or diminish
the doctrines of vicarious and contributory liability for
copyright infringement or require any court to unjustly
withhold or impose any secondary liability for copyright
318
infringement.
First, the Staple Defense would not have applied to infringement
under this amendment, so new technologies that would not have fallen
under this amendment, but would have been subject to contributory
liability would continue to struggle over the uncertainty encumbered by
319
the Staple Defense.
Second, this broadly drafted amendment to the
Copyright Act would have increased the secondary liability doctrines in
copyright law. It is unclear by how much this amendment would
broaden the scope of the copyright holder’s monopoly; however, the
words “aids” and “abets” could lead to judicial ensnarement of many
320
new technologies. This author questions whether the Betamax would
have survived such language because Sony, through its agents,
advertised “library building,” which was clearly an infringing use of
321
Sony’s product.
Accordingly, such advertisements may have caused
copyright owners to argue that Sony aided, abetted, or induced its
customers to infringe. Furthermore, because, approximately 44.2% of
users owned eleven or more Betamax tapes, a strong argument could
have been made that a significant portion of Betamax users operated
their Betamaxes for “library building” and, therefore, Sony relied on the
322
infringement for its commercial viability.
Whether commercial
viability refers to that of the product or that of the enterprise is unclear
from the text of the amendment; accordingly, this amendment would
have caused more uncertainty in this area of the law. In contrast, the
IPCP Act incorporates the concept of inducement as a waiver of the
Staple Defense—consistent with the Court’s decision in Grokster and
not as broad as Hatch’s proposed amendment—because one who invites
323
infringement becomes ineligible for the Staple Defense.

318. See 150 CONG. REC. S7189-02 (daily ed. June 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
319. See id.
320. Id.
321. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 480 F. Supp. 429, 436 (C.D.
Cal. 1979), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 659 F.2d 963, (9th Cir. 1981), rev’d, 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
322. See id. at 438. When plaintiffs asked interviewees how many cassettes were in their
libraries, 55.8% said there were ten or less. Id.
323. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 936–37
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6. The Proposed Legislation Is Consistent with the Aforementioned
Case Law
In furtherance of the positive effects caused by creating a more
certain and clear rule for technology innovators to follow, the IPCP Act
would also dictate consistent outcomes with the important judicial
decisions outlined above. First, Sony would likely have had the same
outcome because it would have reached the first safe harbor’s
benchmark at the outset of the technology’s distribution, or if it had
happened to miss the safe harbor, the technology later progressed
enough with users watching movies they bought, rented, or made at
home to reach the second safe harbor’s benchmarks at three and six
324
years.
The only point of doubt would be whether the copyright
owners presented strong enough evidence that the Betamax was
advertised for home users to build libraries and, thus, invited others to
325
infringe.
Optimistically speaking, Sony would probably not have
allowed such advertisements if the IPCP Act had been passed by
Congress. However, advertising to build a library may not have been
infringing conduct if Sony argued that it only advertised for its users to
build a library consisting of authorized programming. Consequently,
under the proposed legislation, Sony could have come out the other way
if the Court felt that such advertising was sufficient to invite
infringement, but it is more likely that the Court would have come out
the same way because such conduct may not have been infringement,
and the primary business model and advertising campaign relied on
326
time-shifting as the primary use of the product.
Second, RCA Records would have had the same outcome because
the IPCP Act does not protect operators of new technologies, only
327
manufacturers and developers.
Next, Vault Corp. would have come
out the same because all of the technology’s uses were legal and were
328
the advertised uses of the technology.
Finally, all the peer-to-peer technology cases would have come out
the same—that is, against the developer of the technology—because

(2005); In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 652 (7th Cir. 2003); A&M Records, Inc.
v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1020 n.5 (9th Cir. 2001).
324. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984); In re
Aimster, 334 F.3d at 650.
325. See Sony, 480 F. Supp. at 436.
326. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 453.
327. See RCA Records v. All-Fast Sys., Inc., 594 F. Supp. 335, 339 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
328. See Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 267 (5th Cir. 1988).
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each of those developers invited third parties to infringe copyrights vis329
Without those bad equities,
à-vis their peer-to-peer technologies.
however, those technology developers likely would have satisfied one of
the IPCP Act’s safe harbors by having ten percent noninfringing uses
after ninety days of distribution and, thus, would have been able to
distribute the technology for at least three years. The future of these
technologies would have depended on the progressions after the three
and six-year periods described in the IPCP Act. However, these
technologies may have had much different life cycles if their business
models were not based on infringement; so having the three-year grace
period would not likely have been as harmful to copyright owners as, for
example, letting the Napster of our time operate with carte blanche for
three years.
CONCLUSION
Unless third parties cease using innovative technologies
nefariously—that is, pirating copyrighted works rather than purchasing
them—then the courts can anticipate struggling to apply the current
version of the Staple Defense. Instead of waiting for new judicial
pronouncements, Congress should consider legislation resembling the
IPCP Act. Although Congress should institute findings regarding the
effects that the benchmarks will have on innovators and authors, the
Staple Defense’s uncertain progression from Sony, a five to four
decision, to Grokster, a decision with two concurrences reflecting
conflicting rationales, is clear evidence of the need for such legislative
change.
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